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ABSTRACT
Growth dynamics are often explained by insatiable wants or
anthropological constants, modelled as preferences and behavioural
axioms. By contrast, structural perspectives postulate a growth
imperative due to macroeconomic or monetary system-inherent
properties. Reconciling both perspectives, we develop a relational
structure–agency framework to evaluate growth imperative hypotheses.
We analytically separate the credit structure (including balance-sheet
mechanics and nominal uncertainty) from institutional structure, and
describe decision norms for households, entrepreneurs, commercial
banks, central bank, and the state. Our framework suggests that the
interplay of credit principles, income-dependent saving and portfolio
saving rationales prevent the interest rate from adjusting downwards
and thereby cause mature credit economies to stagnate.
Underemployment results in growth policies becoming the dominant
norm – seeking, under budget constraints, to overcome declining
growth rates. Our method helps identifying agency to resolve this
imperative. Preventing real asset inflation to relieve monetary policy at







Mature economies are revealing a pattern of declining growth that is likely to continue (Gordon
2016). The experiences in Japan for more than two decades and elsewhere following the
financial crisis 2007–8 have given rise to a renewed discourse on secular stagnation (Baldwin
and Teulings 2014, Benigno and Fornaro 2017). Declining growth rates seem ecologically desir-
able, since current economic activity levels heavily conflict with sustainable resource use (Haberl
et al. 2011), and absolutely decoupling economic growth from resource use is unachievable
(Hickel and Kallis 2020). However, declining growth rates can also be related to unemployment,
public debt, and social inequality (Stockhammer and Klär 2010), making them undesirable
from a socio-economic perspective. Is growth needed or even imperative? Conversely, can a
non-growing economy be socio-economically sustainable and maintain full employment (Kallis
et al. 2012)? In this paper, we refine existing hypotheses surrounding this apparent dilemma
by developing a structure–agency framework for institutional macroeconomic analysis.
Frequent starting points for problematising economic growth are individual profit seeking, striv-
ing for higher income and wealth, consumption patterns, and underlying treadmills (Binswanger
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2006). Resulting prescriptions seek to change individual and social preferences accordingly. Yet,
even conspicuous consumption, positional goods or aspirational goals can only very partially
explain seemingly insatiable economic growth demands (Sanne 2002).
At the institutional level, the use of GDP indicators is considered another growth driver (van den
Bergh 2009), as a collective focal switch to other measures might reduce attention to economic
growth (Roth 2017). In contrast, a fundamentally structural growth imperative hypothesis is based
on credit creation, which dates back to the work of Soddy in 1926 (Kallis et al. 2009). The obligation
to repay debts, including interest, would require unconstrained credit creation and therefore con-
tinuous economic growth. More fundamentally, a stationary economy would become impossible,
as insufficient growth provokes a downward spiral (Binswanger 2012).
Growth imperative hypotheses rarely reflect their implicit social ontology and, therefore, theories
as well as policy implications remain constrained. Whereas methodologically individualist
approaches neglect the structural determinants of agency (Colander 1993), structural approaches
downplay the capacity of agency to transform structure (Bhaskar 1998, Emirbayer and Mische
1998). Seeking to reconcile these two poles, we present a novel and more nuanced heuristic frame-
work and ‘practical social theory’ (Archer 1998, p. 194) applicable for characterising the ‘laws of
motion’ (Boyer 2010) of a credit economy. First, we develop an analytical framework combining
structural principles, institutions and actors’ decision norms motivated by actors within given struc-
tural settings. Based on this analytical framework, we theoretically derive a growth imperative result-
ing from stagnation – a state here defined as insufficient economic growth to create full
employment. Stagnation, unlike Mill’s classical stationary state without unemployment, has a norma-
tive-negative connotation (Spahn 2001). We argue that the interplay of structural principles and
decision norms (income-dependent saving and portfolio rationales) keeps the interest rate persist-
ently above the level needed for full employment. Consequently, a political growth imperative
results from an urge or compulsion to overcome stagnation.
Finally, we derive potential practical implications for transformative agency to resolve the growth
imperative, distributed among different actors. We show that taxing land, for example, as the most
important real asset category, could relieve the central bank’s monetary policy at the effective lower
bound where real asset flight occurs, and helps to overcome the growth imperative. A comprehen-
sive analysis of practical implications needs further research.
A Structure–Agency Framework for Institutional Macroeconomics
To explain the structural embeddedness of behaviour, we draw from classical institutionalism
(Rutherford 1996), economic sociology (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992, Beckert 2003) and neo-
intuitionalism in organisational analysis (Scott 2008). From this perspective, institutions are not
necessarily functional or enabling economic efficiency. However, such approaches risk an ‘over-
socialized’ conception of actors (Wrong 1961), subject to ‘structural reification’ (Bhaskar 1998)
without volition, which has led to demands for a theory to account for reflexive dynamics and
change of structure based on agency. A critical realist philosophy of science emphasises the onto-
logical distinction between structure and agency by treating them as analytical categories in their
own right (Archer 1998). In addition, a nuanced treatment of structure appears crucial (Fleetwood
2008), and helps to situate institutions as emergent structures, contingent upon, and caused by
more fundamental macroeconomic structural principles.
Structure as Principles
A crowd of people at a soccer game has a pre-existing organising structure that is irreducible to indi-
viduals’ aggregated interactions. This emerging and enacted structure exerts constraining or
enabling formative powers on the individuals and fosters the dynamics of the crowd as a whole
(Lawson 2013). We argue that, in a credit economy, in addition to such institutional structure,
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there is a form of structure beyond rules, norms, and habits, defined here as structural principles.
Credit is such a structure, with strongly emergent causal (or rather formative) properties, irrespective
of its actual geo-historical evolution (Lawson 2016). Although accompanied by cultural structures
and varying accounting rules, the balance principles are always and everywhere the same. As fre-
quently pointed out by Keynesian economists, the monetary macroeconomic level in a credit
economy follows rules which differ decisively from a simple aggregation of microeconomic decisions
(Holt and Pressman 2001). Based on formal mathematical laws with their own identities and quasi-
mechanistic causalities, as in Saldenmechanik (Stützel 1978), a credit economy generates emergent
(proximately causal) downward formations. Below, we briefly sketch these laws in terms of balance-
sheet mechanics and their formative power in the paradox of thrift.
The early institutional economists Commons and Veblen had already elaborated micro- and
macroeconomic implications of the credit economy, with close relations to Keynesian thought
and existing fertile common ground (Vatn 2009), but the potential for integrating institutional
with macroeconomic reasoning has remained largely untapped (Wäckerle 2013). To bridge these
gaps, supported by arguments regarding the macrofoundations of microeconomic behaviour
(Colander 1993), we suggest integrating macroeconomics within a relational structure–agency fra-
mework, as summarised in Figure 1. We then apply this to the credit economy and growth impera-
tive hypotheses.
Structure as Institutions
Most social sciences and humanities share an idea of institutions shaping action. According to
Streeck (2011, p. 153), institutions ‘precede actors and regulate their behaviour with the force of
legitimate authority, even though actors may have internalised the norms enforced on them’.
From this angle, a growth imperative could be considered a constrained mental (cognitive) infra-
structure or social imaginary (Reichel and Perey 2018).
Figure 1. A structure–agency framework depicting the key components of the credit economy.
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Among other existing categorisation schemes, institutions can be sorted into regulative, normative,
and cognitive ‘pillars’ (Scott 2008). The regulative pillar consists of laws, regulations and organisational
rules. Resulting from collective choices, such rules are not self-enforcing and require legitimation. The
normative pillar consists of self-enforcing established expectations, such as professional norms within
which themembers of a professional group are socialised. The cultural-cognitivepillar is an evolutionary
product of internalised routines and habits. Such institutions may have their origin in solving technical
or social coordination problems but, over time, become unquestioned, routinised, and socially
expected behavioural guidelines. Institutional evolution is not necessarily a selection process towards
increasingly rational and effective institutions. Institutions often persist and endure (Weik 2015).
Decision Norms
Rational choice theory typically models optimising behaviour, such as utility maximisation, based on
behavioural axioms. In contrast, economic sociology and (evolutionary) institutional economics
emphasise the structural embeddedness of preferences, tastes, rationality and market behaviour
(Swedberg and Granovetter 1992, O’Hara and Stagl 2002, Beckert 2003). Comparative experimental
studies in economics support the argument that rationality is not a universal anthropological con-
stant (Camerer et al. 2004). Yet, there are norms of rational behaviour that are functional for ‘surviv-
ing’ in the structural context of any credit economy, commonly modelled as ‘behavioural equations’
in macroeconomics. As soon as credit relations expand, actors are inescapably affected by balance
sheet mechanics and need to calculate in monetary terms: production processes are rationalised to
be able to sell products at prices above costs to repay debts, including interest (Heinsohn 2008). As
Durkheim noted: ‘As an industrialist I am free to apply the technical methods of former centuries, but
by doing so I should invite certain ruin’ (as cited in Bhaskar 1998, p. 219). Such self-enforcing norms
are not prescribed or socially sanctioned but, rather, end up being preferred, as long as others act
accordingly (Dequech 2009), making them cognitive norms shaped by shared mental models. We
label this sub-set of institutions decision norms, to indicate representative rationales and practical,
situational responses to structural contexts. With this, we also highlight the non-universality and
structure-relational embeddedness of decision norms. Decision norms can thus explain stabilised
expected behaviour but rarely satisfactorily explain the variation of norms, let alone institutional
change and more fundamental structural transformation.
Actors and Agency
The notion of agency seeks to account for volition and intentionality behind human action, including
the power of actors to intentionally or unintentionallymaintain and transform structures. Agency refers
to morphostasis (reproduction) as well as morphogenesis (change) – an ‘actor’s ability to have some
effect on the social world – altering the rules, relational ties, or distribution of resources’ (Scott
2008, p. 77). Agency is a ‘temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the
past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative
possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualise past habits and future projects
within the contingencies of the moment)’ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p. 963). Critical realism recon-
ciles the proximate causal power of structure with the intentions of actors striving towards goals
(Archer 1998). Structure pre-exists individuals and is a necessary condition for and limitation upon
agency, without being able to completely determine (reify) actors and their behaviour (Bhaskar 1998).
We have chosen an open, non-axiomatic approach to studying how agency is motivated. Several
needs and values have been proposed as bases for motivation (Alkire 2005). The manifold sources of
self-interest or other-regarding preferences remain outside the scope of our framework. Moreover,
we cannot assume fully structure-conscious rationalities, as ‘people, in their conscious activity, for
the most part unconsciously reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures’ (Bhaskar 1998,
p. 215) they encounter, indicating the morphostatic aspect of agency.
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Whereas decision norms situate practices in a given context, the morphogenetic aspect of agency
refers to the reflexive capacity of actors to purposefully alter behaviour and institutions and, thereby,
initiate structural transformation (Bhaskar 1998). Structural principles and institutions comprise a
social structure, exerting downward formative powers on actors and, consequently, shaping decision
norms and constraining (though not completely impeding) agency. With such a framework, it
becomes possible to conceptualise the growth imperative as a structural macroeconomic
outcome that exerts downward formations constraining self-directed decisions. We now apply
this framework to the credit economy, developing an argument for our claim.
Growth Dynamics in a Credit Economy
Neoclassical models typically perceive money as a neutral veil facilitating exchange, and credit as the
consequence of prior savings. However, in two-tiered banking systems, credit is the primordial step
for providing means of payment. This understanding can be traced back to the early central banking
theory of Thornton and Bagehot (Thornton 1802, Riese 2004, Mehrling 2010). Our perspective on the
credit economy builds on post-Keynesian and circuitist approaches (Rochon 1999, Graziani 2003),
balance sheet mechanics (Stützel 1978, Godley and Cripps 1983), and Monetary Keynesianism
(Betz 2001, Riese 2004, Schelkle 2005).
Structural Principles of a Credit Economy
Using money in a credit economy requires several institutions such as laws or banking practices, as
well as legitimation and acceptance of those institutions within a community. While there is exten-
sive research on the historical emergence of institutions around money, social ontological reasoning
suggests to focus on universal properties irrespective of their geo-historical evolution (Lawson 2016).
In this sense, a credit economy is built on nominal credit relations manifested in balance sheets.
A fundamental precondition for such generalised credit relations is the nomination and accep-
tance of a unit of account (numeraire). Once accepted, all nominal assets and liabilities of actors
involve the financial sector and are mirrored in the assets and liabilities of financial institutions
(Graziani 2003). Any financial transaction between two actors then necessarily leads to respective
changes in banks’ balance sheets of both. Within this system, all financial assets and liabilities
must necessarily balance out to zero. In other words, there is no net stock of money and there
are no savings if all debts are cancelled out. If someone saves income, others are forced to
remain in debt. The saving decision is fundamentally relational.
Credit implies the simultaneous creation of an asset and a liability in the balance sheets of the
crediting bank and its debtor. No ex-ante saving is necessary. Yet, savings are necessary to
refinance credits ex-post, which is perfectly in line with the theory of endogenous money (Spahn
2001). When granting a credit, a bank becomes liable to provide money to a debtor, but, simul-
taneously, creates a claim on the debtor in the form of an asset. The debtor, utilising the newly
created asset by withdrawing money from her account, makes a payment, and the money ends
up in the receiving actor’s account. The crediting bank must then provide the liability credited to
the debtor, which ends up in the bank account of the receiving actor. The crediting bank now
needs to refinance its assets ex-post via the interbank market or private deposits, as explained later.
The debtor can use this credit for productive investment purposes. The producer of such physical
production capital receives an income, which can then be saved. Without income, no savings can
emerge. Since there is no net stock of money, a credit must precede savings. Consequently, invest-
ments determine savings: ‘Keynes’ intellectual revolution was to shift economists […] to thinking in
terms of a model in which a dog called investment wagged his tail labelled savings’ (Meade 1975,
p. 82). This reversed causality – loans create deposits and investments precede savings (Rochon
1999) – is a cornerstone of Keynesian macroeconomic thought, implying that assets can only be
created through debts, and a reduction of debts necessarily requires a reduction of nominal
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assets (Stützel 1978). No debts, no money, and no economic activity apart from non-measured sub-
sistence activities. Consolidating these ideas, we derive our first structural principle:
Structural principle P1: Credit creation / balance sheet mechanics
Credit is contracted on the basis of a generalised nominal unit of account (numeraire). Credit simultaneously
creates debts (liabilities) and nominal wealth (assets) on balance sheets.
Meanwhile, some scholars base their growth imperative hypotheses on the credit principle and
interest payments (Binswanger 2009, 2012, Kallis et al. 2009). As the act of credit creation produces
only the amount required to redeem the debt (principal), continuous credit expansion would be
necessary to enable interest payments. Therefore, according to this line of argument, credit expan-
sion would require growth. However, as we argue, if wealth owners were to completely spend their
income, including interest income, then debtors could sell their products or services on the market
and generate the income needed to repay all debts, including interest. Debtors would not have to
sacrifice consumption to repay interest, and the economy would not contract.
When fully consumed, interest payments as such simply imply income transfer, as is already
apparent in eighteenth century economist Quesnay’s Tableau Économique, where he presumed
that by saving, unsold goods would result in missing input for subsequent production processes,
reducing output, economic surplus and consumption (Pressman 2007). In his sequence of tables,
Quesnay therefore focused on complete consumption. Without net savings and accumulation, a
stable redistribution economy would, in principle, be possible (Freydorf et al. 2012, Wenzlaff et al.
2014, Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie 2016, Richters and Siemoneit 2017). It would be redistributive,
due to interest income enabling wealth owners to consume more than debtors, and stable,
because the economy would not contract. This hypothetical world is unrealistic, but the model
proves that interest payments or profits as such do not constitute a growth imperative.
More realistically, some income is saved, shifting the problem from the assumed missing money
for interest payments to actors’ saving decisions. Saving decision norms can vary and are contingent
upon environmental and societal uncertainties. In pre-monetary societies, environmental uncertain-
ties were collectively borne and only became individualised with the advent of the credit economy
(Heinsohn 2008). Nevertheless, in most economies, some individual uncertainties regarding future
obligations are reduced by compulsory public health or social insurance systems, which seek to ame-
liorate – to employ Marxist terminology – the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism. Conse-
quently, P1 simultaneously enables and forces actors to save.
Holding nominal wealth (deposits, bonds), however, bears the risk of incalculable losses, due to
currency inflation or depreciation. Such depreciation is only possible if wealth is measured in terms
of real assets or prices of foreign currencies. This uncertainty effects how actors allocate savings
between nominal and real assets. Nominal uncertainty constitutes our second principle:
Structural principle P2: Nominal uncertainty
The generalised numeraire of a credit economy generates nominal uncertainty, because nominal wealth can
depreciate relative to other numeraires (foreign currencies), real assets, or commodities.
By forming actors’ decisions, credit creation (P1) based on a numeraire has universal mechanistic and
inescapable downward consequences. However, although nominal uncertainty (P2) necessarily
follows from nominal generalisation and credit mechanisms (P1), this uncertainty can vary within
different institutional contexts, including monetary policy regimes, central bank independence,
social welfare systems, or collective bargaining with trade unions.
Institutional Structures in a Credit Economy
The geo-historically developed institutional structure is contingent upon the credit economy, but
levels of regulation, public goods provision, or social protection vary significantly across countries
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and epochs (Streeck 2011). Also normative expectations vary, for example concerning fair prices or
interest rates, as do cultural institutions concerning the tolerance of inequality or tax levels. Mean-
while, institutions such as labour market regulations or social security systems are not considered to
disturb but, rather, strengthen the functionality of a credit economy (Schelkle 2005). High degrees of
protection via public social security systems tend to reduce nominal uncertainty (P2), as does inde-
pendent central bank governance. Institutional complementarities (Amable 2016) also exist with
regard to credit regulations and banking practices. In our framework, institutional structures comp-
lement structural principles and decision norms: Credit requires institutionalised financial intermedi-
aries, predominantly banks; sales require institutionalised markets; and buying land requires
institutionalised law. Institutional structures can mitigate or reinforce growth dynamics, but
remain constrained by structural principles:
Institutional structure I1: Mediation between structural principles and actors
Whereas structural principles are the universal emergent properties of a credit economy, institutional structures
are geo-historically contingent. Institutional structures complement and mediate between structural principles
and actors’ decision norms.
Actors and Decision Norms
To model the key mechanisms and circuits of a credit economy, here we consider the basic decision
norms of three economically relevant actors: entrepreneurs, consumers, and wealth owners. Moreover,
these individual actors are part of one or multiple collective actors, each following their own decision
norms: banks, central banks, and the state.
Entrepreneurs: Income generation requires initial credit-based investment, enabling production
processes to start. Although savings finance some investments, savings as such could not exist
without a credit taken elsewhere, since all financial assets and liabilities always balance out to
zero (P1). Investments are realised by entrepreneurs, who are constrained by expected demand,
labour costs determined by wage levels, capital depreciation, and capital costs determined by inter-
est rates. As Keynes (1936, p. 212) stated, ‘the prospective yield with which the producers of new
investment have to be content cannot fall below the standard set by the current rate of interest’.
No matter whether entrepreneurs employ capital through equity, debt or retained revenues, the
opportunity costs of capital make it unlikely for them to accept returns below the market rate in
the long run. Conversely, entrepreneurs do not require positive net profits above the market rate
of capital costs, that is, after paying returns on equity (dividends), interest, and taxes, because
they generate their income through wage and risk premiums. Entrepreneurs also invest in the
hypothetical but empirically less frequent case of full competition, where no positive net profits
are generated. Interest and dividends are costs to entrepreneurs and transitory payments to
wealth owners. An appropriate reward for the working time is analytically considered a wage and
not profit, although this is empirically difficult to separate. Therefore, we propose:
Decision norm N1: Entrepreneurial investment rationale
Entrepreneurs assess profitability and invest in production processes in return for wage and risk premiums,
based on expected consumption demand (see consumers’ N2, below), production costs, and the minimum
financial capital costs, influenced by wealth owners, who finance investments (see N3, below).
This also includes cases where entrepreneurs provide capital in their role as wealth owners, or
financial entrepreneurs, but these actors are still faced with two separate decisions regarding invest-
ing and financing. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial decision is frequently treated as the investment
function of a firm. The firm, however, is a collective actor that consists of entrepreneurs, workers and
wealth owners, as principals of firms providing equity or debt capital. The firm itself is, therefore,
already covered by the component actors’ decision norms and does not require additional consider-
ation for our purposes.
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Consumers: We follow Keynes’ assumption of the marginal propensity to consume, implying that
saving is predominantly a function of income, not the going interest rate (Keynes 1936, p. 96). This
hypothesis has been refined to include intertemporal considerations, aspects of income uncertainty
and relative income, but current income dependence remains the most important explanatory vari-
able (Palley 2009). Economic experiments (Duffy 2008) and observational studies have also generally
confirmed that income levels and not interest rates determine marginal saving rates (Bosworth
1993). A weak correlation between saving decisions and interest rates (Schmidt-Hebbel and
Servén 1999) actually points towards a reverse causal relationship between interest-dependent
income and savings. Irrespective of whether permanent or only current income is considered, the
relative share of consumption generally decreases with higher income. Actor decisions to normally
save out of income are mediated by institutional settings (I1), interrelated with uncertainty (P2). In
order to buffer against nominal liabilities arising from future unexpected events, precautionary
(not speculative) saving beyond planned, postponed consumption becomes rational:
Decision norm N2: Income-dependent saving
Individual saving and consumption rates are a function of income, not interest rates. In addition to postponing
consumption, saving can buffer actors against unpredictable future liabilities.
This decision norm also makes the mechanism of equilibrating savings and investments more
intricate than the loanable funds model suggests. According to the loanable funds hypothesis,
actors’ time-preference functions make saving sensitive to interest rates, such that an increase in
savings decreases the interest rate and, thereby, increases and equilibrates investments. Within a
Keynesian framework, however, increased savings neither increase investments nor decrease the
interest rate. Even worse, investments and total income could decline to meet the low consumption
demand induced by increased saving. If the interest rate does not directly equilibrate savings and
investments, how is it determined and what is the equilibrating mechanism? As developed in the
following, not the rationale whether to save but how to save is crucial.
Wealth owners: In order to explain the existence of a positive real interest rate along with system-
atically underutilised capacities, including unemployed labour, Keynes (1936) introduced the
concept of liquidity preference (LP). In contrast to the neoclassical concept of interest as an intertem-
poral price equilibrating the supply and demand of capital, LP allows interest to be theorised as ‘a
non-temporal price to be paid from current income in order to curb the agents’ liquidity preference,
i.e. to make them willing to part with money and stay illiquid in the current period’ (Spahn 2001,
p. 36). Note that the LP hypothesis is not to be confused with the loanable funds hypothesis,
where investments require prior savings. Rather, the LP hypothesis applies to an endogenous
credit economy, because credit needs to be refinanced. The LP explains the typical upward slope
of the term structure of interest rates, where rates on long-term savings and time deposits are nor-
mally higher than on liquid deposits (see Figure 2). Holding money (as the most liquid asset) creates
a non-pecuniary liquidity premium, implying a lower risk of wealth loss, as compared to long-term
nominal wealth, which tends to be subject to uncertain price changes, default of debtors or banks, or
simply extra costs when unforeseen liabilities occur that require turning time deposits back into cash
before maturity. All of these relative uncertainties associated with long-term nominal wealth emerge
from P2. Unlike risk-neutral actors, risk-averse actors seek to protect their wealth by avoiding such
uncertainties. Consequently, risk taking by giving up the non-pecuniary liquidity premium requires
interest as a pecuniary compensation (Spahn 2001, Riese 2004). Liquidity does not compensate for a
maturity premium but, rather, for the risk of nominal wealth losses due to interest rate changes
(Marglin in press). However, as Marglin points out, asset markets determine ‘only the spread
between the yields on the assets that comprise the market’ (in press, Ch. XII).
Put differently, the LP can only explain the slope of the term structure of interest rates but not its
level. Compared to long-term nominal wealth, money is secured against losses in nominal assets but
not against wealth losses in real terms. Such a securitisation would require indexation or controlling
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real-asset inflation with monetary policy. When land prices double, for example, one million Euros
can only buy half the land that it could beforehand. Consequently, Monetary Keynesianism has intro-
duced real value preference (RVP) to explain the interest rate level as a compensation for holding
nominal instead of real assets (Betz 2001, pp. 102–4). Empirical studies support this proposition
by identifying a shift to real estate during periods of inflation uncertainty (Piazzesi and Schneider
2016). Note that the RVP includes gold, art or other assets and implies a premium from hoarding
that is different from rents resulting from productive employment of the assets. We derive the ‘port-
folio decision’ (Rochon 1999, p. 292) of how to save as follows:
Decision norm N3: Saving portfolio rationale
Real value preference (RVP): Real assets are preferred over nominal assets, because the latter are not secured
against losses in real value.
Liquidity preference (LP): Liquid nominal assets (money) are preferred over illiquid nominal assets because the
latter imply higher risks of wealth losses.
We conclude that wealth owners first claim pecuniary compensation for holding nominal instead
of real assets, and second, for holding long-term assets instead of liquidity, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 also illustrates the real risk premium, which accounts for investment-specific default risks,
whereas the real asset premium accounts for the general risk of devaluation of nominal assets.
Before we introduce the banking system, let us evaluate some prominent growth imperative hypoth-
eses in the light of the findings so far.
Some hypotheses argue positive profits require the total economy to generate surpluses through
growth, because firms reduce investments as soon as net profit expectations decline (Gordon and
Rosenthal 2003, Binswanger 2009). This argument needs refinement for at least three reasons:
First, entrepreneurs’ investment decision does not require profits but entrepreneurial income (see
N1), unlike the financing decision by wealth owners (N3). Second, net profits, just like interest
income and economic rents, could hypothetically be consistent with a stationary economy, if
profits were consumed. It is the combination of profit and the marginal propensity to consume of
those who receive profit that is essential for a growth imperative. Net saving is the necessary con-
dition. Third, the implicit assumption of firms having the power to keep gross profits (including
costs for debt or equity) systematically above normal market returns remains largely unexplained.
Indeed, markets are rarely perfect, and forms of industrial relations, financialisaton and other physical
and institutional factors influence profits. Although institutional structures may allow firms to extract
Figure 2. Interest rate composition of the term structure of interest rates.
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superprofits (Marx) or quasi-rents (Schumpeter), these excess sources of income are institutionally
contingent and not to be conflated with the market mechanisms that determine a minimum
market return through the saving portfolio decisions of wealth owners (see N3).
Beyond regimes of financialisaton, extra profits typically result from natural monopolies and
restrained competition, product innovation (often secured by property rights), and capital- or
labour-saving process innovation.
The latter, technological change, is another argument for a growth imperative. A frequent
assumption is that labour-saving technological change explains unemployment and even a
growth imperative (Rezai et al. 2013). If technological change generates surpluses, labour’s bar-
gaining power determines whether these surpluses occur as profits or wages. The decisive ques-
tion, again, is whether these incomes are consumed or saved. In the real credit economy, unlike
Quesnay’s hypothetical complete consumption, distribution matters: If unemployment is high and
labour’s bargaining power weak, profits accrue to wealth owners, who have a higher propensity
to save (N2). If bargaining power is high, wages increase. Then, productivity gains could be chan-
nelled into working-hour reductions. We conclude that neither the entrepreneurial norm (N1) nor
technological change as such support an unconditional growth imperative hypothesis. Income-
dependent saving (N2) and the saving portfolio decision (N3) direct us towards theorising a
growth imperative, nonetheless. This, however, requires integrating the banking system into
our framework.
Commercial banks: Banks do not need deposits (savings) to provide credit ex-ante but, rather, to
refinance credit ex-post. Refinancing lending is possible through wealth owners’ deposits, interbank-
or central bank credits. To reduce costs, banks typically leave a gap between the maturity of liabilities
(mostly deposits) and assets (mostly loans), termed maturity transformation.
Decision norm N4: Maturity transformation
Banks maximise profits from interest margins between loans and deposits by optimising maturity transform-
ation, keeping liabilities shorter termed than assets.
Under competition, the private vice of profit-seeking maturity transformation becomes a public
virtue, since margins are reduced, and lending rates drop. Deposits can be used for transactions and
simultaneously refinance long-term loans. However, there is a trade-off between desirable low
lending rates and undesirable bank illiquidity risks arising from excessive maturity transformation.
Introducing the central bank will explain how this trade-off is managed.
Central bank: In a two-tiered banking system, one central bank function is that of a lender of
last resort, stabilising the credit market by preventing liquidity shortages, bank runs and conta-
gion (Thornton 1802, Mehrling 2010). More fundamentally, however, we consider the function
of limiting maturity transformation via monetary policy to protect the currency from inflation
or depreciation induced by capital flight (Riese 2004). Imagine a hypothetical banking system
with a common numeraire, endogenous money creation and competition between commercial
banks but without a central bank: every bank maximises lending, and no bank would need
deposits, which means that all loans were short-term financed. The social cost for the whole
system would be high inflation potential, because without interest compensation wealth
owners are likely to shift portfolios into foreign currencies or real assets (N3). Consequently,
national nominal assets would inflate.
The instrument for controlling inflation and inhibiting portfolio shifts is the policy rate at which
commercial banks can lend from the central bank (Gnos and Rochon 2007). This central bank reac-
tion function was discovered by Wicksell, ‘the founder of monetary macro theory’ (Spahn 2001,
p. 40), who postulated that the policy rate should respond to the natural rate, as determined by
(non-monetary) forces of capital supply and demand. However, except for times of true capital scar-
city, such as in post-war economies, post-Keynesian reasoning has discredited the idea of a persist-
ent and positive natural rate, as strongly formulated by Leijonhufvud: ‘denial of the loanable funds
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mechanism makes a nonsense of the very notion of a ‘natural rate’ of interest. The Wicksellian theme
is lost’ (Leijonhufvud 1981, cited in Rogers 1989, p. 22).
From our viewpoint, however, Wicksell’s reasoning on the policy rate remains valid, if we only
replace the determinants of the natural rate with LP and RVP. His idea of monetary policy reacting
to market forces – implying that the central bank is a market participant, rather than acting
above the market (Riese 2004) – remains crucial. A positive policy rate creates the incentive for com-
mercial banks to pay interest on deposits, as an alternative to central bank credit. More importantly,
the norm of short-term central bank credit leaves commercial banks unsure about short-term adjust-
ments of the policy rate. It would then be risky to refinance long-term loans (assets) with weekly
central bank credits (liabilities) or only with short-term deposits. This explains why interest is paid
on deposits, so banks need to plan refinancing costs for the longer term.
The discretionary policy rate allows the central bank to react to economic conditions that could
otherwise induce inflation, as inflation uncertainty would induce portfolio shifts (N3) away from
holding nominal wealth in the national currency. Paid interest on nominal assets creates a willing-
ness to hold nominal wealth, because it compensates for loss of real value premiums. These func-
tions – forcing banks to re-transform maturities by favouring deposit attraction as well as
inhibiting portfolio shifts – translate into two central bank decision norms:
Decision norm N5: Control of maturity transformation
Central banks provide short-term refinance credit to commercial banks at a policy rate sufficient to limit maturity
transformation (N4).
Decision norm N6: Control of price levels
Using the instrument of the policy rate, central banks target price stability (constant but low inflation levels) to
reduce nominal uncertainty and, thereby, create wealth owners’ willingness to hold nominal wealth (N3).
Commercial banks reconsidered: The introduction of a central bank and its decision norms requires
an extension of the decision norms of commercial banks. Banks’ maturity transformations to reduce
costs (N4) are limited by the short-term nature of central banks’ refinance credits (N5) and resulting
uncertainty arising from possible policy-rate changes. Excessive maturity transformation risks
becoming unprofitable when interest rates on short-term liabilities exceed rates on long-term
assets (Hellwig 1994). This explains why commercial banks pay interest on deposits. Therefore:
Decision norm N7: Deposit attraction
Due to uncertainty about changes in policy and money market rates, banks attract long-term deposits by paying
interest to limit maturity transformations.
State: For our purpose, consideration of the state is limited to its economically relevant fiscal
dimensions. In line with Keynesian reasoning, we consider the state an economic actor under
budget constraints as part of the income circuit. Budget management involves tax and transfer
regimes, public spending ratios, and debt levels. When introducing the macroeconomic rationale
of the state, a preference to strive for growth becomes apparent. Economic growth serves actors
best – both as consumers and wealth owners – and simultaneously improves the state’s fiscal
condition (van den Bergh 2009). Higher employment increases tax revenues and decreases trans-
fer obligations (Wenzlaff 2019). Note that this does not require an additional public choice per-
spective of democratic party competition. We summarise the economic rationale of the state into
one global norm:
Decision norm N8: Budget and debt management
The state adjusts spending via taxes and debt. Tax levels are constrained by national income, whereas debt
levels are constrained by the differential between interest rates and future economic growth rates. Stimulating
growth and employment receives policy priority.
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Macroeconomic Outcomes
The interactions of actors’ decision norms (N1-8) with structural principles (P1-2) jointly produce
mechanisms that lead to a growth imperative. We have argued above that purely structural
growth imperative hypotheses do not hold if all interest and profit incomes are consumed. But
what happens if savings increase?
From the Paradox of Thrift to Stagnation
According to the loanable funds model, savings are invested via financial intermediaries. As a con-
sequence, effective demand – defined as consumption plus capital goods demand – could never
fall short, since decreased consumption is replaced by entrepreneurs’ capital goods demand.
Increases in savings would reduce interest rates and, thereby, stimulate investments. From a Key-
nesian perspective, increased savings are not automatically invested and can therefore decrease
effective demand. Keynes (1936, p. 358) discussed the intellectual history of this seeming
paradox, dating back to the seventeenth century. By means of actors’ decision norms, a
dynamic version of the paradox with endogenous investments can be derived. In a loanable-
funds world, investments increase with higher savings and savings increase with a rising interest
rate. These causal relationships do not exist when interest rates are determined by portfolio ratio-
nales (N3) and saving rationales (N2) depend on income. This ‘analytical distinction between
choices affecting the disposition of income and choices affecting the disposition of wealth’
(Tobin 1965, p. 671) is crucial for deriving a dynamic paradox of thrift. Saving (N2) reduces con-
sumption demand, and portfolio choices (N3) prevent the interest rate from dropping beneath
LP and RVP, whereby entrepreneurs are prevented from realising investments that could increase
total demand (N1). This paradoxical mechanism operates, although in principle entrepreneurs never
face a shortage of credit (P1). We conclude:
Macroeconomic outcome MO1: Mechanism of thrift
In cases where LP and RVP (N3) hold, increased saving can restrict investments and therefore reduce rather than
expand total income and realised ex-post savings.
Figure 3 depicts the causal mechanisms between income, saving and portfolio decisions along
with the recursive effect of savings on total output.
The dynamic thrift paradox can be used to explain long-term macroeconomic outcomes,
especially persistent underemployment beyond cyclical deviations (Stockhammer and Klär 2010).
Keynes already proposed that ‘the interest rate may fluctuate for decades about a level which is
chronically too high for full employment’ (1936, p. 204). Some scholars have reformulated this
reasoning to focus on short-term frictions, such as ‘rigid wages’ (Modigliani 1944). In contrast,
post-Keynesians have developed different lines of argument regarding persistent unemployment
as an involuntary feature of the credit economy. We adopt the idea of underemployment as a
long-term structural equilibrium in a credit economy (Betz 2001) by integrating the mechanisms
of LP (N3) and marginal consumption propensity (N2) to explain systematic insufficient demand.
This tendency of underemployment keeping the economy under its potential implies stagnation
(Baldwin and Teulings 2014). While some theories of stagnation also consider supply-side factors, the
‘possibility of involuntary unemployment due to weak aggregate demand’ (Benigno and Fornaro
2017, p. 36) is increasingly accepted as the core issue of stagnation, here defined as the state of
an economy which would require higher levels of national income to reduce unemployment
(Kimmich and Wenzlaff 2012, Wenzlaff et al. 2014). Therefore:
Macroeconomic outcome MO2: Stagnation
The mechanism of income restriction (MO1) can create persistent underemployment, which results in income
levels and growth rates below an economy’s potential.
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Central Banks Reconsidered
Monetary Keynesianism provides a strong argument for persistent unemployment via the link from
LP and RVP (N3) to central bank policy. The central bank being a market participant, and following its
norms (N5, N6), implies the maintenance of a policy rate equilibrating the assetmarket instead of the
labourmarket but at the cost of underemployment and stagnation – the ‘prevention of a wage–price
spiral is the duty of monetary policy, unemployment may be a by-product’ (Spahn 2001, p. 43). This
outcome conflicts with the budget norm of the state (N8), which is best served by full employment. A
sufficiently high real interest level equilibrating the asset market implies a low level of economic
activity and also entails the danger of turning into deflation, with disastrous cumulative effects
(Spahn 2001). Conversely, a low policy rate in favour of N8 risks asset price inflation, creating
nominal uncertainty with regard to real values. We see that price level targets (N6) restricted to
the core inflation of commodities cannot control asset price inflation. As observed in the decade
since the financial crisis, lowering central bank rates close to zero, like unconventional Quantitative
Easing, does not stimulate investment in production processes anymore, but, rather, triggers real
asset inflation, indicating that RVP becomes effective. This constitutes the key central bank
dilemma (Kimmich and Wenzlaff 2012):
Macroeconomic outcome MO3: Central bank dilemma
The central bank is trapped in a dilemma: controlling price stability (N5) by controlling maturity transformation
(N6) versus stimulating investment and employment (N8).
The Growth Imperative
Our considerations so far have sought to explain why capital accumulation cannot drop the interest
rate, as was assumed in classical political economy. Conversely, the interest rate can prevent further
accumulation, as capital must remain scarce to earn the market interest rate (Proudhon 1849). In
Keynes’ words: ‘The question why capital is scarce is […] best regarded as being, in the long run,
the same question as to why the rate of interest exceeds zero’ (Keynes 1934, cit. op. Spahn 2001, p. 32).
The interest rate not only causes unemployment but also sustains income inequality by establish-
ing an income-transfer channel to wealth owners. Inequality reduces potential effective demand,
Figure 3. Causal mechanisms in a credit economy. National income is defined as income from consumption and investments
(Y≡C + I). Savings result from income not consumed (S≡Y− C). Consequently, also S≡I must hold.
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because high-income actors have relatively higher saving rates. In other words, sustained income
inequality contributes to increases in savings. This mutually self-enforcing interplay of savings, deter-
mined by the marginal propensity to consume (N2), and the interest rate, determined by portfolio
preferences (N3), constitutes an urge for growth:
Macroeconomic outcome MO4: Growth imperative
The tendency of a credit economy to systematically generate unemployment and inequality implies that higher
growth rates would help to temporarily overcome unemployment (N8). In this sense, the economy’s actors are
subject to a growth imperative.
Yet, this imperative, as defined above, does not imply actual growth but, rather, that the economy
would have to grow to mitigate unemployment and inequality, albeit without ever transcending
stagnation. In this paradoxical situation, the same underlying cause of declining growth and stagna-
tion (i.e. the non-adjusting interest rate) also prompts actors to push for growth, especially the state,
to keep the system functioning (N8).
Land and Resource Scarcity
Apart from the already widely discussed ecological conflicts of economic growth (Haberl et al. 2011),
we emphasise here a different effect that stems from holding natural resources as portfolio assets in
a context of stagnation. Extending the real asset portfolio to natural resources intensifies when
central banks reduce interest rates and experienced nominal uncertainty rises (P2). The effects result-
ing from interest rates that are too low is vividly illustrated by the global empirical trend of portfolio
shifts into real estate (Piazzesi and Schneider 2016) and agricultural land acquisition (Visser 2017),
and becomes increasingly problematic in a resource-constrained future (Stratford 2020).
Note that, as mentioned above, the non-pecuniary premium of holding real assets is independent
of arbitrage considerations concerning resource rents (Allais 1962). Furthermore, there is a circular,
mutually re-enforcing relationship, as growing portfolio shares of resources (N3) that are kept idle
increase scarcity and resource price levels, aggravating nominal uncertainty (P2). An established
finding is the recessionary effect of resource scarcity on income and consumption, with repercus-
sions on the growth imperative (MO4). With increasing natural resource scarcities, this effect is
likely magnified. Therefore:
Macroeconomic outcome MO5: Resource scarcity
The development and expansion of property rights for physically finite resources and their appropriation creates
economic scarcity and thereby generates a real value premium (N3). Economic resource scarcity has the poten-
tial to generate inflation and can thereby increase nominal uncertainty (P2).
While labour scarcity potentially leads to inflation and, therefore, requires monetary policy reac-
tion by central banks to assure price stability (N5 and N6), natural resource scarcity may not be
encountered in a similar manner. There is, for example, an ongoing debate regarding how, if at
all, monetary policy should react to domestic inflation prompted by oil price shocks (Kilian 2014).
This research generally endogenises the effects of demand on global resource scarcities and,
thereby, analyses whether growth is inhibited by natural resources.
Exploring Transformative Agency
The macroeconomic outcomes yield some general directions towards resolving the growth impera-
tive. A common proposal suggests implementing alternatives to the GDP indicator. Yet, products
must be sold, income generated, and debts redeemed (Heinsohn 2008) – and GDP measures
provide an indication for investment decisions. They become necessarily pervasive, omnipresent,
and persistent (van den Bergh 2009) as a result of the growth imperative.
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Similarly, firms’ profits do not seem to constitute a growth imperative. Entrepreneurs may even
develop or support alternative, more social- and sustainability-oriented (for example cooperative)
business and finance models. However, the real structural constraint of balance-sheet mechanics
(P1) – the fact that production requires credit, and sales must cover all costs, not only wages and
capital depreciation, but foremost interest or dividends – remains.
This turns our attention towards wealth owners. However, we cannot expect wealth owners to
abstain from returns by engaging in practices such as ethical banking. Such practices of minorities
could only flank regulations established by the state or central bank.
On the side of consumers, lowering consumption levels alone would be ineffective. Addressing
the growth imperative requires lowering income via working-hour reductions (Sanne 2002, Rezai
et al. 2013), since increased savings would otherwise fuel the growth imperative. Institutional struc-
tures such as trade regimes or labour unions can collectively constrain or mediate such agency.
The central bank has been presented here as a market participant reacting to market forces. It
responds to wealth owners’ RVP and LP (N3) with a corresponding policy rate (N5), seeking to
ensure an optimal level of maturity transformation (N6). If the policy rate was nothing more than
a political variable or convention (Gnos and Rochon 2007), the central bank could reduce it to stimu-
late full employment. As illustrated with the central bank dilemma above, however, reducing the
policy rate would increase the expectations of inflation and, therefore, induce portfolio shifts
towards real values, creating real asset inflation. Although there are various solutions to the technical
challenges of overcoming the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (Buiter 2009), the problem
of RVP creating asset price inflation would not be resolved thereby. Conversely, real asset taxation
would liberate central banks to implement negative interest rates without creating real asset
inflation.
The state could resolve the central bank dilemma by taxing real assets, creating quasi-carry costs
and reducing their real asset premium and thereby lowering their attractiveness in relation to
nominal assets. The central bank could then regain agency for lowering the policy rate. There are
indications that this taxation reduces real asset premiums and prevents bubbles in the context of
real estate (Crowe et al. 2013). The taxation of land has received renewed attention to recapture
rents, is already implemented in several countries (Ryan-Collins et al. 2017), and has been early
acknowledged to lower interest rates (Allais 1962). Real asset premiums are also reduced by
different land and resource governance modes or public housing regulations, including cooperative
ownership and commons.
Conclusions
We have developed a structure–agency framework to investigate growth imperative hypotheses in
mature credit economies. Such hypotheses have received increasing attention, given the widely
acknowledged lack of ecological, social and economic sustainability of mature economies, which
are also typically coping with stagnation, unemployment, and inequality.
Our framework distinguishes and relates structural principles, institutions, decision norms, and
agency. Balance sheet principles result in macroeconomic emergent properties that can neither
be explained by aggregating individual action nor by institutional evolution alone. The saving
decisions of one actor inescapably lead to downward formative effects on all other actors.
Our application informs the discourse on growth imperative hypotheses by refining some promi-
nent hypotheses. The mutually self-reinforcing interplay of savings accumulation, based on the mar-
ginal propensity to consume, and interest rate determination, based on liquidity and real value
preference, generates stagnation. Fostering growth becomes the dominant policy response to
counter underemployment.
Our results point towards agency on the levels of institutions and decision norms. We believe that
one promising option to reduce real interest rates is the taxation of real assets, especially land, which
reduces the lower bound for effective monetary policies, including negative nominal interest rates.
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Simultaneously, land value taxation reduces growth dependency of the state budget. While techni-
cally easily feasible, political acceptance is difficult and requires a power-relational political economic
analysis. In contrast, it seems unlikely – though imaginable – that monetary structural principles, as
‘real’ constitutive structures of complex modern societies, such as the use of a numeraire, can be
transformed (Weber 2018). This implies fundamental changes of societal differentiation and re-
embedding of economic activity (Aigner and Scholz-Wäckerle 2019). We do not make any claims
concerning the feasibility of monetary reform proposals, however, although our framework could
facilitate such a comparative analysis in future research.
To formally test our hypothesis, we suggest advancing models that take into account micro- and
macroeconomic balance sheet foundations, including real value preference and currency hierar-
chies. Central banks’ agency remains constrained by their hierarchical positions within global cur-
rency markets (Betz 2001, Spahn 2001, Schelkle 2005, Kaltenbrunner 2015). Also, institutional
complementarities need further attention, as land and resource governance, public housing or
asset taxation regimes could potentially mitigate the growth imperative. An institutional macroeco-
nomics perspective becomes essential.
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